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ABSTRACT
Passwords, particularly text-based, are the most common authentication mechanisms across all platforms
and services like computers, mobiles, web and network services. Existing password strength evaluators
and online service providers (Gmail, Yahoo, Paypal, Twitter, etc) password strength estimators determine
the effectiveness of passwords chosen by user based on entropy techniques or a similar function of the
parameters: length, complexity and predictability. Such implementations often ignore passwords part of
publicly available password dictionaries and password leaks which are often the primary choice for
malicious adversaries and particularly script kiddies. This paper presents an application that would help in
preventing the use of such passwords thereby reducing the impact of dictionary based password attacks
significantly. The application maintains a database of unique passwords by gathering publicly available
password dictionaries and passwords leaked over the Internet. The application provides users with an
interface to query the database and verify if their passwords are already available on the Internet thereby
preventing them from the use of such passwords.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Passwords are the primary choice for authenticating users and are likely to remain for a significant
amount of time in the future [1] [2] because of the practicality and convenience aspects associated with
them for service providers and end- users respectively. Qualys [3] identified password guessing attacks as
a top cyber security risk after analyzing attack data from TippingPoint intrusion prevention systems
deployed for protecting 6000 organizations.

A pre-known list of passwords is gathered together to form a password dictionary tile. Dictionary attacks
leverage such password dictionaries and automate the attempt of breaking in to password-protected
applications and systems by trying each word/password listed in the password dictionary. Dictionary
based password cracking is easy to execute and almost every password cracking tool is bundled with a
pre-built dictionary thereby aiding script-kiddies in performing dictionary based password attacks.
Attackers build comprehensive password dictionaries by compiling passwords from various dictionaries
and password leaks.

Alexander Lystad analyzed password leaks from password attacks on Rockyou and phpBB [4], and
observed that the percentage of unique passwords that can be cracked using common well-defined
dictionaries (like John-The-Ripper, Cain & Abel, etc) is 33.41% and 39.43% respectively. The analysis
indicates the necessity of enabling users to be aware of such passwords and thereby prevent them from
using those passwords. With passwords being the most common form of authentication and a critical
aspect of identifying users while providing necessary privacy, password based attacks and defense
systems are subjects of ongoing research.
The primary goal of this project is to build a database of unique passwords from publicly available
password dictionaries and passwords leaked over the internet, and implement an application that would
allow regular users and administrators to verify if their passwords are susceptible to dictionary attacks.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review which
details existing work in authentication mechanisms particularly passwords and dictionary attacks (their
detection, prevention and response systems). Section 3 details the design and implementation aspects of
the application developed. Section 4 presents statistics related to password dictionaries, leaks and attacks.
Section 5 and 6 discuss future work and conclusion respectively.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Linux pluggable authentication module (PAM) pam_cracklib [5] incorporates a similar approach to the
proposed as it is used to test passwords against dictionary words. The Linux pam_cracklib module allows
system administrators to incorporate strength checking for user passwords against a system dictionary
followed by a set of password policies [5]. The drawbacks of pam_cracklib module are poor
documentation, limited implementation (few *nix distributions) and that it is primarily aimed for use by
system administrators [6].

Saikat Chakrabarti and Mukesh Singha! present an analysis of existing dictionary attack prevention
techniques and their drawbacks. They discuss about encrypted key exchange based protocols for
protection against oftline dictionary attacks. For thwarting online dictionary attacks, they discuss account
lockout, delayed response, extra computations and Reverse Turing Tests (RTT) [7]. The Password-based
Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) by Steven Bellovin and Michael Merritt incorporates a combination of
cryptographic schemes to prevent oftline dictionary attacks but it was later observed that the EKE and
variants of EKE protocols are vulnerable to plain text equivalence which would allow an adversary to
masquerade as a victim by using his hashed password captured through eavesdropping [8] [9]. Delayed
responses and account locking are common countermeasures for online dictionary attacks as they reduce
the number of passwords that can be guessed in a given time and lock the user account after reaching a
threshold set for failed login attempts. However, as outlined by Pinkas et. al these countermeasures can
result in denial of service and increased customer service costs as a result of account locking. Further, an
attacker can try multiple login attempts in parallel with different user accounts to circumvent delayed
response and account lockout countermeasures [I]. The extra computation based technique involves the
inclusion of non- trivial computation in addition to providing the password. The idea of such a technique
is to incorporate a large overhead for password attack tools as it would require computation for every
login attempt thereby reducing the number of attempts significantly. The extra computation technique
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might present usability issues for a legitimate user while an adversary can tackle the overhead by using a
powerful attack machine or environment [7]. Pinkas et al. use a similar approach by incorporating RTT
technique to prevent automated programs from carrying out dictionary attacks. In this approach, the user
needs to present his password and pass the RTT to ensure a successful login [I]. However, it was
observed by Stuart Stubblebine and Paul van Oorschot that the RTT-based implementation is prone to
RTT relay attacks [7]. Several real world RTTs (also called as CAPTCHAs which refer to Completely
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) implemented by popular online
service providers have been broken in the past using computer character recognition based projects [IO],
[11] [12] [13].

Techniques for improving authentication or protection against password attacks in general range from
hardware based solutions, biometric authentication, client certificate mechanisms, graphical password
schemes, grid based logins, multi- factor authentication etc [I]. Pinkas et. al present a range of such
existing authentication mechanisms and drawbacks associated with them [1], which are discussed as
follows. The hardware and biometric based authentication solutions form a robust authentication
technique but also include a range of drawbacks like additional costs and overhead associated with the
need for additional devices and migration from traditional password based authentication. Additionally,
hardware based authentication solutions also involve usability issues as a result of losing or forgetting
device. Multi-factor authentication schemes often combine passwords (something you know) with
hardware (something you have) or biometric solutions (something you are) and hence demonstrate the
same drawbacks as of hardware and biometric solutions along with other convenience issues. Client
certificates is another solution that implements a software based authentication approach but include
drawbacks associated with key portability and storage.

There are a vast number of password strength evaluating applications available over the Internet that
assist users in determining the strength of the passwords chosen by them [14]. Examples for such
4

password evaluating applications are Password Strength Checker at passwordmeter.com [24], GeodSoft
Password Evaluator [ 15], GetSecurePassword [16], How Secure is My Password? [17], etc. Further,
almost every online service provider implements a password strength indicator to allow users to gauge the
strength of their password while setting up a new account or changing their existing password. Serge
Egelman et. al observed that password strength meters result in stronger password selection by users for
important accounts [18] but these online password strength determining tools and password strength
meters do not take publicly released passwords into consideration while determining the strength of user
chosen password.

The Online Domain Tools team analyzed common password strength evaluating tools available over the
Internet and noted that entropy and complexity are the primary strength determination parameters while
only a few tools considered dictionary attacks [14]. Online domain tools incorporate dictionary attack
based password strength determination application [19] on their website where they break down
passwords, observe the presence of regular dictionary words or parts of it, the presence of leetspeak and
other pattern analysis techniques but the application doesn't consider publicly available passwords.
Online services like pwnedlist.com [20] and shouldichangemypasswordnow.com [21] obtain the user's
email address and _verify if their accounts have ever been compromised based on emails and passwords
gathered from password leaks over the internet. These services inform the user about the presence of their
passwords in public on the basis of their email address. The passwords from dictionaries and leaks that
are not associated with any emails are ignored by these services and hence do not prevent users from
using passwords already available on the Internet.

Another online project leakdb by Abusix states gathering leaked and publicly available human generated
hashes as its objective [22]. This project is similar to the concept demonstrated in this paper but it is
different from the application presented in this paper for the following reasons. The leakdb project
maintains a database of hashes available over the Internet. It takes a hashed value as input and reports the
5
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corresponding clear text if it is present in the leakdb database. The project only stores cracked hashes in
the database thereby missing leaked hashes (available on the internet) that haven't been cracked yet. Also,
it doesn't consider passwords from common password dictionaries and passwords leaked in plain text
over the Internet. Further, querying uncracked hashes results in submission of such hashes to leakdb
password cracking feature without notifying the user about such an implementation prior to querying.
This presents a risk to the users as their password is added to the leakdb search database after being
cracked.

The various limitations in terms of costs, usability, awareness, etc. associated with alternate
authentication schemes often result in users sticking with the traditional password based authentication
schemes. These alternate authentication schemes and password attack defense systems require selection
of a regular password and an additional item (something you have/something you are). Dictionary attacks
can be tackled at the root level by aiding the users in selecting passwords that are relatively less prone to
dictionary attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate a technique that aims at equipping users with a
dictionary attack based password evaluation system thereby encouraging them to avoid publicly available
passwords and preventing them from being simple targets.
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3 APPLICATION DETAILS
3.1

Application

The application built comprises of a user interface, a database and helper components. The database for
this application primarily contains schemas for each hash value supported by the application. These
schemas maintain the database of passwords gathered from various password leaks and dictionaries over
time. The database also has a submission schema that is responsible for maintaining database of user
input ranging from feedback to information about password leaks and dictionaries. The user interface is a
web application that provides a search bar in order to allow users to input passwords and query the
presence of their password in the password database. The helper components of the application are
responsible for working behind the scenes to facilitate gathering of password dictionary or leak sources
and import passwords into the password database. The web application was built on PHP backed by a
MySQL database. The helper components (importer, harvester and statster) were implemented in python.
The helper components are discussed next in this section.

3.2

Helper Components

I) Importer: The importer component of the application is responsible for obtaining passwords from a
file (password dictionary or password leak) and importing each password into the database. The user
passes the following parameters to the importer utility: FILENAME, FORMAT, FILETYPE, DATE and
URL. Passwords in the password dictionary or leak are typically in the same format - plaintext or a hash
type. This input type (plaintext or hash) of passwords is provided by the FORMAT parameter. The
Fl LETYPE parameter refers to the type of the password file and it is either of leak type or dictionary type.
The DATE parameter, as the name implies, refers to the date on which the security breach happened or
the date the passwords were released to public. The URL parameter can either be a media post about the
breach or the location where the password leak or dictionary are hosted.
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2) Harvester: The harvester component of the application is responsible for searching and harvesting
information about password dictionaries, security breaches and password leaks. The harvester component
is a collection of scripts that generate an output file with URLs of potential password dictionaries,
password leaks or information associated with them.
3) Statster: Statster is a collection of scripts used for generating statistics outlined in Table 1. These
scripts calculate the total number of entries contributed by a leak or a dictionary to the database and the
crackability aspects. The crackability aspect for online service providers (like Google) or password
strength estimating websites (like passwordmeter.com) refer to the percentage of passwords (in a leak
file) that were identified as weak by those online service providers or password strength estimating
websites while for a password database (built using leaks, dictionaries, etc) like the password database
built in this paper (referred to as CommonDB) and crackstation's password dictionary [25] (referred to as
CrackstationDB). Additional information about the statistics is provided in the statistics section of this
document. The scripts for calculating the crackability aspect for Google's password rating mechanism
[23], passwordmeter.com [24] and CommonDB were implemented in python while the utilities for
calculating crackability aspect for CrackstationDB were obtained from the crackstation-hashdb github
repository [26] and modified to our requirements. Additional information about the statistics is provided
in the statistics section of this document.

3.3 Working
The application working comprises of two processes: building the password database and the web
application for serving user queries.

3.3.1

Building the password database

The first step in the process of building the database involves gathering password dictionaries and leak
sources by the application maintainer. These sources are then inserted into the submission schema of the
database that also stores user feedback and details of password leak or dictionary sources submitted by
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application users. These sources (typically URLs) are then verified manually in order to avoid potential
database poisoning by malicious users.

The verification process involves identifying at least 3 media posts relevant to each URL. After
verification, password files are downloaded from URLs obtained using harvester utility, user submission
and manual research. The importer utility is leveraged to upload passwords into the database. A database
schema is created for each new hash format. This way the database would have a collection of schemas
like md5, shal, etc. Passwords are uploaded to the specific schemas based on their hash type. If a leak or
a dictionary file has passwords in plaintext, they are converted to md5 hash and stored in md5 schema.
This is to ensure that the application works with hashed version the password only to prevent any
potential misuse.

Building the Password Database
INPUT

DB INSERT

D

VERIFY
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Manual

Research

I

Insert Uf{Ls
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different
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the
Submission
Database
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Output
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Submissi()(ls
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Figure 1: Building the Password Database
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The application database has been designed considering the performance and scalability aspect. If a
password file has been identified with a hash format that does not have a corresponding schema yet, the
importer utility will create a schema for that hash format and subsequently all the leaks or dictionaries
that have passwords in this hash format will be uploaded to this schema as separate tables as opposed to
maintaining a single table for storing all the hashes. This way, for a specific hash input the respective hash
schema will be searched rather than searching the entire database. The same has been depicted using the
following two figures. Figure 2: Current database represents the current database while Figure 3: Future
Database refers to the database structure when different hash inputs are imported into the database.
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3.3.2

Application Work.flow

The workflow of this application is similar to a standard web application workflow for a search operation.
Using our application, the user enters the password in a search bar and selects one of the two radio
buttons that are used to determine if user input is in plaintext format or in hashed format. On submission
of this search form, the PHP search script is fired on the server side that takes user's input and converts it
into a hash if the input supplied is in plaintext format following which a search for that hash in the
database is initiated. If the user input is already in hash format, the input hash is searched directly in the
database without any hashing process. The application looks for user hash in specific database schema
based on hash format (for eg. if the user input is a sha I hash, then the password is searched in sha 1
schema only) while on the other side if the user input was in plaintext, user input is converted into each
hash format supported by our application and searched in all hash schemas until the hash is found. The
final step of this process is alerting the user if the password hash was found in our database or not and
also informing them about the source (leak or dictionary name) in which the hash was found. The
application doesn't store passwords inputted by user.

,r Oa:abase

,splay Rasul:
to User

)

Figure 4: Web Application Workflow
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3.4 Application GUI & Usage
Website: Home Page

The home page of the web application presents a search bar for receiving user's password. Since,
passwords are in plain text or hash format we present the user with two radio buttons to present the
application with the type of input. In addition to the user input, the home page also focuses on providing
users with some important information about the application with the intention of encouraging them to
use this application.

Statistics
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Hash

More Information

• C�ar text p.assword
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• SHA1
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Updates
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Figure 5: Website - Home Page
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Website: About Page

The about page of the website is a simple page provides general background information about the most
common authenticating mechanism - passwords and the state of existing password strength estimation
utilities. The page also describes the goals of this project.

FAQ

PasswordslnPublic

Terms & Conditions

Contact

The Project
Almost all ex1st1ng pass,..ord strength evaluators and online seMce pr<Mders (Gma1I, Yahoo mail, Paypal, Twitter etc) password strength estimators
determine the effectr.eness of passwords chosen by user based on different entropy techniques or a s1m1lar function of the parameters length complexity
and unpred1ctab1lrty These techniques often ignore passwords part of publicly available password d1ct1onanes and passwords leaked as a result of a
secunty breach These publicly released passwords are often the first choice 1n password attacks for a malicious adversary and particularly scnp1-k1dd1es
This website 1s an attempt to min1m1ze he use of such pass,..ords thereby reducing the impact of d1ct1onary attacks significantly
Passwords are still the most common form of authenticating mechanism used to identify users and are likely to remain for a significant amount of time in
the future because of the practicality and convenience aspects associated w,th them for the seMce providers and end-users respect,vely A preknown 11st of
passwords are gathered together to form a pass,..ord d1ct1onary file D1ct1onary attacks leverage such pass ..ord dict1onanes and automate the attempt of
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passwords leaked over the 1ntemet and allow regular users and administrators to venfy 1f the,r chosen passwords are suscep11ble to d1ct1onary attacks that
use publicly released passwords

Figure 6: Website - About Page
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Website: Statistics Page

The statistics page of the website provides various statistics associated with the observations of this
project. The statistics page presents the imported passwords statistics and the crackability statistics. The
imported passwords statistics list the source type (password leak or password dictionary) of an import and
the number of passwords imported using each file.
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Website: FAQ Page
The FAQ button on the first page and the FAQ tab present the below shown Frequently Asked Questions.
This page outlines basic information related to dictionary attack and additional information about the way
the application is built which includes handling user's password, password database updates and statistics.
The idea of the FAQ page is to provide transparency about the web application functioning and encourage
user's to try this application.
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Frequently Asked Questions
Here are some common questions and answers that should clear up your queries )·ou can contact us for any other questions that ha'o'en1 been ensv;ered here

What is a dictionary attack'?
A pre-known 11st of passwords ere gathered together to form a password ddionary file. OIC'tlClnary attacks leverage sud! pass\•.1ord d1Cf:10nanes and automate the
attempt of breal..ing rite password-protected applications and systems by tryflg each word/password bted it the password dictionary Dd:Jonary based password
crack119 IS easy to execute and almost e,ery password cract.:119 tool as bundled wlh a pre-buil dld10nnry thereby aldtng scnpt-k.ldd1es m perfomung ddNJnary based
password attacu Attad:ers buict conl)rehensr,e password d1cbonanes by CO"l)1hng passwords from vanous d1chonanes and password leaks
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What should you do if your password is found in our database'?
If your password was found 11 our database. 1f you h1h1e already use that passwords mmediatety change password for al your accounts and verity that there are
no discrep1rncees or unauthonzed changes in those accounts Avoid using passwords found ri our datab8Se for any of your accounts

Where do you get the data and Is the database updated regularly'?
...he applicat10n components invo�te a harvesting infrastrudure that gathers new data e't·eryday. In add1tl0n to the automatic harvest1r1g infrastructure, manual
research and gathering of password dd10nanes and leals are also conducted. The web appic8tion 8tso 8Uows securty researchers to subml leal,., or dlClJonary
1nformabon.The gathered data IS then analyzed and imported r1to our passwor::f database dally

Are there any statistics that you have gathered and compared'?
P�ase refer to our

c page for stats gathered for this proJed

Figure 8: Website - FAQ Page
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Website: Terms & Conditions (Generic)
The Terms & Conditions page lays down standard agreement for a online web application.
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Website: Contact Page

The contact page is an import aspect of this application. The contact page is used for two important
things: receiving password submissions and receiving feedback. The password database is a collection of
password leaks harvested over the internet and the commonly used dictionaries.

i-,orr.,�

PasswordslnPublic

�Li�

'.:tat:5?1C!i

FA::-

,..ern-s ! 2

Submissions
Submit Password Leaks

Submit Password Dictionaries

Feedback

S: ::.t fee:::.:a�· tyt·:<

Figure to: Website - Contact Page
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Usage: Plain text based password query
The following screenshots demonstrate the query for a plain text password input and the result based on
the password's presence in the password database built from leaks and dictionaries.

PasswordslnPublic

P•sswordslnPubltc
password@123
• Pfarriut

More Information

Supported Input: Current
• Clear text pusword
• MD5

Supported Input: Future
• SHA!
• SHA256

Hash

• V'.'hll 11 a d1cbonMy attack?
• How does th,1 '#Ofk?
• Is 11. safe to enttf my password

Updates

ti•"'

• NOit 2013 Added mysp.::e pan-word leak
• NOil 201J Added nx:kyou passllfOfd le•
• Oct 2013 MOS hashH supported

Are q.,est,ons �k• L!'leu runr11ng 11'1 you,
m1'Cf? Cbck on the button bc!IOw and kFIOW
mon1III

Figure 11: Usage - Input Plaintext Password

PasswordslnPublic

f

PasswordslnPubl1c

Password hash already in public!
2138cb6b0302eM382dd9b36n576b24 was found in rockyou password leak.

More Information

Supported Input: Current
• Clear text password
• MD!>

Supported Input: Future
• SHA1
• SHA256

• What ,s a dlct,onaiy attack?
• Ho¥, does th,s wortc?
• ,s rt safe to enter my pa&aword he111?

Updates
• Nov 2013 Added myspace �ssword leak
• Nov 201J Added roclcyou password leak
• Od 2013 MD!, hashH supportad

Ale qu1tiit1ons �ke these runnrng m your
mmd' Ckk on the button belov. and know

"""'"

C PasswordslnPubhc

Figure 12: Usage - Output Password Presence
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Usage: Hash based Query
The following screenshots demonstrate the query for a hashed password input when the password is
found in the password database built from leaks and dictionaries.
- About

PasswordslnPubllc

'

PasswordstnPubl1c
21 38c b5b0302e84 382dd9b36775 76b24
Pl.-iteXI

Supported Input: Current
• Clear text passwo1d
• MD5

o Hash

More Information

Updates

• What 1s a d1ehooary attack?
• How does this WOf'K?
• Is 11 safe to enter my password here?

Supported Input: Future
• SHA1
, SHA256

• NCH 2013 Added myspace password leak
• NO¥ 2013 Added rockyou password leak
• Oct 2013 MOS hashes supported

Ive questions like these running tn your
mi,,d? CNck on the button belD'* and kn0¥11
morellt

0 PassoNordslnP1Jbl,c

Figure 13: Usage - Input Password Hash

ttome

PasswordslnPublic

About

'

Passwords1nPubl1c

Password hash already in public!
2138cb5b0302e84382dd9b3677576b24 was found in rockyou password leak.

Supported Input: Current
• Clear text password
• MOS

Supported Input: Future
• SHA1
, SHA256

More Information
• WIlilt 1s a d1Ct1oriary attack?
• How does this wort,:?
• Is It safe to enter my password here?

Updates
• ND'l 2013 Added myspace password lea!(
• Nov 2013 Added rockyou password 1eak
• Oct 2013 M05 hashes supported

Ase questions like these running in your
mind? Chck on the button below and know
moreut

C Passw0<dslnPublic

Figure 14: Usage - Output Password Presence
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Usage: Password not found in database

The following screenshots demonstrate the query for a plain text password input when the password is not
found in the password database built from leaks and dictionaries.

PasswordslnPublic

PasswordslnPubUc
saS01JQf:::1..ZJcft
�·Pll!lr1text

Support•d Input: Current
• Cleartexts,assword
• U05

Supponed Input: Future
• SHA1

• SltA256

Huh

More Information
• Vv'tlat•1dlctJc,r\ary1ttaO."'
• Howdonth•wor1..'
• Is I sale to enter mv password here'

Updates
• Ptov 2C13 Added myspac:e password 1HI
• Nav 201� Acicted roctyou password IHI
• Oct 2013 I.ID!' hashes aupporte(!

Are QUoffbona lile U'IKe nmn11g " your nwtC"
Clci. on the butte" below and MOv. more

Figure 15: Usage - Input Password

PasswordslnPublic

PasswordSlnPublic

You password was notfound 1n our database!
We are constantly updating our database, please check back later!

Supponed Input: Current
• Clear text password
• UD5

Supported Input: Future

More Information
• 'Ntl1t•adlc:klnaryattacl."
• How does this wort'
• Is I sate lo enter m, password hffe'?

Updates
• Nov 2013 Added mvspace password leal
• NC' 2013 Added roclyotJ paSSWOfd teal
• Od 2ce � hashes SYpported

• SHA1
• SHA.256

Are QUesllons Ile these runnng l'I )'(lur fTWl(f?
CIICI. en tile button below and t..now mor,

Figure 16: Usage - Output When Password Not Found
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3.5 Application Deployment Models
The application can be deployed using different models as outlined below:

3.5.1

Cloud Instance

With the convenience and advantages of cloud based implementations, an Amazon Machine Image (AMI)
on Amazon Web Services (A WS) or other such pre-configured images on different cloud platforms would
provide great flexibility. This would allow a regular user as well as organizations to launch the pre
configured passwords-in-public cloud instance for personal and organizational use respectively.

3.5.2

Virtual Machine

Virtual Appliance is another deployment model that can be considered for organizations. The application
can be packaged and installed on a virtual machine so that it can be easily setup in the organization's
private data center or in house deployment. Organization's concerned about transmitting password over
the network outside their organization can consider the virtual appliance deployment model. Different
virtual appliances can be built to support variety of virtualization platforms like VMware, KYM, etc.

3.5.3

API Model

The application can also be provided as a service using public or private API for querying user or
employee passwords and identifying the presence of their chosen password in the password database. The
AP! can accept password as the input and return information associated with that password like presence
in the password database, number of leaks that have this password, etc.

3.5.4

Database Only Model

The last model described in this section is the database only model where users or organizations would be
allowed to download the password database only. This model will not be a pre-configured application and
the user or organization opting this deployment model must build an command line or web based utility to
interact with the application.
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The deployment models cloud instance, virtual appliance and database only can be bundled with an
update script that would allow users to update their database periodically. Additionally, these models can
also be leveraged to build a scalable implementation. The cloud instance deployment model would allow
organizations to spin multiple instances to cater to the needs of a large user base. Similarly, they can
deploy multiple virtual appliances to on their virtualization platform when option for virtual appliance
deployment model while the database only deployment model would allow the users to clone or replicate
the password database to serve large user requests.
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4 STATISTICS
The proof of concept for this paper is based on our database that included a sample of passwords
(CommonDB column) harvested and gathered from easily available password leak files and commonly
used dictionaries. The commonly used dictionaries considered for this test included john-the-ripper (27],
cain (28], twitter's banned passwords and 500 worst passwords (29]. To demonstrate the potential of the
concept presented in this paper, we also considered Crackstation dictionary (25] which is a popular
password dictionary that has "1212356398" passwords gathered from various sources.

Table I presents the statistics that compare how an online service provider (Google), an online password
strength estimating utility (passwordmeter.com) and password databases built for this paper (CommonDB
and CrackstationDB) fared when tested using password leak files listed in Leak Name column. Actual
password leaks contain real passwords of people and were hence considered as a basis for the
comparison.

For the comparison, the number of passwords from password leak files identified as weak were noted for
Google's password rating mechanism and for PasswordMeter's password rating website while on the other
hand the number of passwords from leak files found in CommonDB and CrackstationDB were noted.
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Table 1: Password Strength Comparison

Leak Name

Total

Google

SimpleDB

Passwords

Password

CrackstationDB

Meter

Alypaa

1384

35.48

71.37

98.99

100

Carders

1904

26.79

68.54

80.73

93.22

Elite Haecker

895

45.81

88.16

98.99

100

(Pastebay Malware)

55

20

49.09

87.27

100

Facebook (Phished)

2442

13.96

100

76.6

99.84

Faithwriters

8347

19.98

59.6

26.67

100

HakS

2351

9.23

24.97

60.95

100

MySpace

37144

8.06

49.92

76.82

99.97

PhpBB

184389

7.35

40.29

79.49

100

Porn Unknown Site

8088

30.46

75.64

95.57

100

Singles.org

12233

22.11

100

91

100

Ultimate Strip Club

38820

14.34

51.65

81.84

100

12413667

0.37

1.95

72.91

99.97

Facebook

Rockyou
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The statistics demonstrated that the percentage of passwords identified as weak by Google's password
rating mechanism (Google) was significantly lower than the percentage of passwords that are part of other
leak files and common dictionaries (CommonDB). On the other hand, the password rating mechanism at
passwordmeter.com (PasswordMeter) fared significantly better than Google and CommonDB. The
concept of password database was expanded from CommonDB to CrackstationDB to better demonstrate
the potential of the application. The statistics for CrackstationDB presented an average of 99.4% success
rate in terms of finding a password in the Crackstation dictionary thereby demonstrating the best
performance.
These statistics justify that existing password strength evaluating applications and online service's
password strength estimator primarily focus on parameters like entropy, length and/or complexity and do
not consider dictionary attacks while evaluating user passwords, thereby providing incomprehensive
password strength estimation.
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5 FUTURE WORK
The existing implementation does not incorporate other password strength determination parameters for
determining the strength level of the password selected by the user. Future work could be integrating
demonstrated approach that focuses on dictionary-based attacks with existing password strength
evaluators that primarily focus on entropy, complexity and randomness. Integrating the demonstrated
technique into password settings of applications, password setup routines of operating systems, online
web services and password strength indicators can also be considered as an avenue of future work. The
technique discussed in this paper can also be integrated with password managers (LastPass, Browser
password managers, etc) to alert users when the passwords selected by them are found in the database.
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6 CONCLUSION
The area of implementing authentication mechanisms, improving password based authentication
mechanisms and assisting users in selecting secure passwords is under constant research. In addition to
the improvement in password based authentication systems, password attack defense techniques and
password strength evaluators, security researchers and evangelists must make efforts to continually
educate and guide users about alternate authentication mechanisms, selection of passwords and the
various password based attack techniques. The technique demonstrated in this paper incorporates the
concept of guiding and enabling the users to select relatively secure passwords from a dictionary attack
perspective by informing them about passwords that are part of publicly released password dictionaries
and leaks. Integrating such a technique with existing password rating mechanisms would result in a
thorough and comprehensive password strength estimation.
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8 Appendix
8.1

Appendix: Scripts

8.1.1

Password Importer

,1,,, n111 , 111 / 11110,1

l1-

from _future_ import division
from warnings import filterwarnings
import MySQLdb
import hashlib
import sys
import argparse
import ConfigParser
import os
import pdb

filterwarnings('ignore', category=MySQLdb. Warning)

f ,,,,, or,h 1111 ,he p,1,,11

� /J,1/ <it,,

,·. I

def crackability_db(infile, dbcreds):
ef = open('/\ ar/\, W\\ /bootstrap/statistics, entries.csv', 'a')
leakname = inti le.split(".")[O]
hashtype = infile.split(".")[1]
datevalue = int(infile.split("_")[2].split(".")[O])
if hashtype == 'plaintext':
32

hashtype = 'md5'

lh, """·. 11,H,. Lh,11,0,

1h,

t.t,

lci11v ll'L'. , , ,, frotll ,., .. ,,

db = MySQLdb.connect(dbcreds[O], dbcreds[l ], dbcreds[2])

cur = db.cursor()
try:
,.,/i q Pl ,;7, / a,·,1 ,,rj, /1e/011).;

I

db.select_db(hashtype)

u
query = "SELECT table_name FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.T ABLES WHERE
TABLE_SCHEMA = 'o/os"' % hashtype
cur.execute(query)

l\

tables = []
for table in cur.fetchall():
if leakname in table[O]:
continue
tables.append(table[(])

crackcount, hashcount = 0, r,
with open(infile, 'r') as cf:
for hash in cf:
33

hash = hash.rstrip()
hashcount+= I
for table in tables:
If //1/t/,Jf)fl \J>flf• I

query = "SELECT hashvalue FROM o/os WHERE hashvalue = 'o/os' LIMIT I"%
(table, hash)
res_rows = int( cur.execute( query))
if res rows == I :
print query

crackcount+= I
break
elif res rows == ):
continue
print "=========================================="
print "Final:", crackcount, hashcount

crackability = (crackcount / hashcount) * I ')()
print crackability
print leakname+ ":"+ str(crackability)

entry = leakname+ "."+ \
str(crackcount)+ "_"+ str(hashcount)+ "."+ str(crackability)+ "' n"
ef. write( entry)
print "Completed"
print "----------------========---------------- --"

except:
print "Error!"

def im port_passwords( dbcreds, infilename):
I
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/.,.,/7/J/h

if infi lename.split(".")[ 1] == 'plainte-.t':

hashtype = 'md5'
else:

hashtype = infi lename.split(".")[ I]
pass

tablename = infilename.split(".")[O]
infi lepath = str(os.getcwd())+"/"+infi lename
JW/111 ll(J\'ht.l'f'

db = MySQLdb.connect(dbcreds[(], dbcreds[ I], dbcreds[2])

/';. i)l1J1" LI

'/,I\ 1/

cursor = db.cursor()
try:

sql_cd = "CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXIST5 ° os" %hashtype
1

print "\n [+] import:",sql_cd

db.select db(hashtype)

sql_ct = "CREATE TABLE °'os (hashvalue VARBINARY(60) NOT NULL. UNIQUE
(hashvalue))" %(tablename)
print "\n[+] import:",sql_ct

/()1{)/>17
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sql_ld= "LOAD DATA IN FILE'%s' INTO TABLE %s FIELDS TERMINATED BY'' LINES
TERMINATED BY'\n"' %(infilepath,tablename)
print "\n[+] import:",sql_ld
I\

cursor.execute(sq 1_cd)
cursor.execute(sqI_ct)
cursor.execute(sql_ld)
db.commit()
except MySQLdb.Error, e:
/(

if db:
db.rollback()
print "Error: %d: %s" %s( e.args[ J], e.args[ I])
sys.exit( )
finally:
db.close()

def build_infile(pwdfile, detaiIs):
infilename = "%s_%s_%s.%s.temp" %(details[ ],details[O],details[,].replace('-',"),details[--1])
try:
inf= open(infilename,'v\')
with open(pwdfile, 'r') as pf:
36

for each in pf:
print each

'II' /l'u'f/1,tr

II

each= each.rstrip()
if details[-+]== 'plaintext':
if each.strip():

hash_value = hashlib.mdS(each).hexdigest()
print each, hash_value
else:
continue

else:

hash value = each

inf.write(hash_value)
inf.write("\n")

except:

pf.close()
inf.close()

finally:

pf.close()
inf.close()
return infilename

def main():
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='lmport pass\rnrd dictionaries or leaks into the
pass\\ ord database')
parser.add_argument('-d', '--diet', help='paSS\\Ord dictionary filename (absolute path if not in current
director))')
parser.add_argument('-1', '--leak', help='paSS\\Ord leak filename (absolute path if not in current
director))')
parser.add_argument('-f, '--format', help='Pass\,ord format in the dictionary\nValid options:
plaintext I md5 I sha I etc')
parser.add_argument('-date', '--date', help='date of pasS\\ ord leak')
parser.add_argument('-url', '--url', help='URL for dictionar) I leak source I media post about leak if
no leak source')
parser.add_argument('-s', '--stats', help='Perfonn statistics calculation onl:, I No infile generation I No
upload I Existing infile must be provided')
parser.add_argument('-b', '--build', help='Use this for building infile')
args = ,ars(parser.parse_args())
print args, len(args)

if args['stats']:
4

/-. l ,l1f1{71J1 ,,,: ·'1 / J \/

config = ConfigParser.ConfigParser()
config.read("conf/importer.conf')
host = config.get('dbaccess','dbhost')
user = config.get('dbaccess','dbuser')
pwd = config.get('dbaccess','dbpass')
dbcreds = [host, user, pwd]
infile = args['stats']
crackability_db(infile, dbcreds)
elif len(args) ! = 7:
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print "Arguments Error"
else:
nu,·,•1 ,rel till 1;,,11,1,·1• t,h

try:
if args['dict']:
pwdfile = args['dict']
type = 'diet'
elif args[' I eak. ']:
pwdfile = args['leak.']
t) pe = 'leak'
else:
raise Exception(" Arguments Error")
sys.exit()

h

JJ I I,·/

config = ConfigParser.ConfigParser()
config.read("conf/i 111 porter.conf')
host = config.get('dbaccess','dbhost')
user = config.get('dbaccess','dbuser')
pwd= config.get('dbaccess','dbpass')
dbcreds = [host, user, pwd]

date = args['date']
source_name= args[t) pe ].split("/")[- I ].split(".")[( ]
source_type = t) pe
source_url = args['url']
hash_type= args['format']
details= [source_name,source_type,source_url,date,hash_type]

39

,II to

,IL I\ Tiff

intilename = build_intile(pwdtile, details)

t c1tl

fr,r ,11\t rt ,/L,, L,

111/0

import_passwords(dbcreds,intilename)

I ·1,f ,I L ,n,t m n

crackability _db(intilename, dbcreds)

except IOError:
print "File doesn't exist or incorrect tile path"

except:
print "Error!!!"

if

name

== ' ma111

main()
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8.1.2

Google Password Rating URL - Stats Generator

·'' '11111,,1/z,l/i

import requests
import sys
import urllib
import subprocess
import time
from collections import defaultdict

def stats():

#labels
WEAK

=

I

MEDIUM =2
STRONG

=

3

VERYSTRONG = 4
filename = sys.argv[ I]
pf= open(filename, 'r')
count= defau!tdict(int)

for p\\-d in pf.readlines():
url= 'http://\\\\\\.goog!e.com accounts/Rate Pass\\ ord?Passwd=' \
+ url!ib.quote_pl us(pwd.rstrip())
try:
print pwd, url

r= requests.get(ur!)
if r.status code == I 0-l:
r= temp_sleep(url)
41

elif r.status code == 2UO:

res = r.text.rstrip()
if res == ' I ':

count['Wcount'] += I
elif res == '2':

count['Mcount'] += I
elif res == '3':

count['Scount'] += I
elif res == '4':

count['YScount'] += I
else:

count['unkno\\ n'] +=
else:
print "HTTP status code is %s" % r.status_code
print r.text

count['not I 04not200'] +=
except Exception, e:
print repr(e)

time.sleep(10)
print count

def tern p_sleep( url):
print"[+] Sleeping for 5 mins"

ti me.sleep(., 00)
r = requests.get(url)
if r.status code == 0-l:

temp_sleep(url)
42

elif r.status code == 200:
return r

def main():

stats()

if

name

main

'·

main()
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8.1.3

PasswordMeter.com - Stats Generator
fi

import sys
from pyvirtualdisplay import Display
from splinter import Browser

#labels
WEAK= I
MEDIUM = 2
STRONG = 3
VERYSTRONG = 4

def stats():

display = Display(visible=O, size=(&Oll, 6ilU))
display.start()
ti lename = sys.argv[ I]
pf = open(filename,'r')
count = {'VWcount':O, 'Wcount':0, 'Gcount':0, 'Scount':0, 'VScount':O, 'Unicode':O}
browser = Browser('firefox')
fileurl = "file:/ /path/to/pass\\ ordmeter.htm I"
browser.visit(fi leurl)

for p'wd in pf.readlines():

pwd = pwd.rstrip()
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if not pwd:

continue

pwdtype= is_ascii(pwd)
if pwdtype:

browser.tiI l('pasS\\ ordP\, d',pwd)
result= browser.find_by_id('complexity').value
if result == 'Ver) Weak':

count['VWcount'] +=
elif result== 'Weak':

count['Wcount'] += I
elifresult== 'Good':
count['Gcount'] += J
elif result== 'Strong':

count['Scount'] +=
elif result== 'Strong':

count['VScount'] +=
print pwd+" : "+ result
print count

else:

count['U nicode']+=
print count

browser.quit()
display.stop()
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print "--------------Fina 1------------------------"
print count

def is_ascii(pwd):
return all(ord(c) < 128 for c in pwd)

def main():
stats()

if

name

=='

main

main()
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8.1.4

Password Database - Stats Generator (CommonDB)

/1\I {'/Ii ('/11 f'\ //if,//
'1(///l <

t1/f-"i - -

from _future_ import division
from warnings import filterwarnings

import ConfigParser
import argparse
import hashlib
import os
import sys
import MySQLdb

,11 I

II

filterwarnings('ignore', category=MySQLdb. Warning)

def crackability_db(infile, dbcreds):

ef = open('/var/wwv\ /bootstraplstatistics/entries.csv', 'a')
fif = open('foundinfile.txt', 'a')
leaknarne = infile.split(".")[C]
hashtype = infile.split(".")[1]
datevalue = int(infile.split("_")[2].split(".")[O])
if hashtype == 'plaintext':
hashtype = 'md5'
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,I

l1J11)f /11,11

'hdJl'..1'/ f/1.) f/t J..·11)(.r ll\'1,, (/

tr,,111 1,u,I

db = MySQLdb.connect(dbcreds[O], dbcreds[l], dbcreds[2])

( ·,., 111n1, J, ,,r"J,

of,,e,._ I

cur = db.cursor()
try:
\(: c.f,Jf,J

1,1r ,I,

,,

f1J t fl1t /Ju,,·1 ,,rel,/-, 11,11, f

db.select_db(hashtype)

(\'/ll ,11 lilt
11,,, ,_1·.1111t

query = "SELECT table_name FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES WHERE
TABLE_SCHEMA = 'o/os"' % hashtype
cur.execute( query)

(•(If

tables = []
for table in cur.fetchall():
( (

print leakname, table[ ']
if table[O] in leakname:
print "table in leak.name"
continue

tabIes.append(tabIe[0])
print tables

crackcount, hashcount = 0, 0
with open(infile, 'r') as cf:
for hash in cf:
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hash= hash.rstrip()
hashcount += I
for table in tables:
If 1111(1.Jh/c \f1///t

"i(}j,

Jc1h \ elf/I,

query= "SELECT hashvalue FROM o/os WHERE hashvalue = 'o/os' LIMIT I"% (
table, hash)
res_rows = int(cur.execute(query))
if res rows== I :
print query

crackcount += I
break
elif res rows == 0:
continue
print "=========================================="
print "Final:", crackcount, hashcount

crackability = (crackcount / hashcount) * 00
print crackabiIity
print leakname + ": " + str(crackabiIity)

entry = leakname + "." + \
str(crackcount) + "." + str(hashcount) + \
"." + str(crackability) + "\n"
ef. write(entry)
print "Completed"
print ''===============---------=================="

except:
print "Error!"

def main():
49

,11 .1!11111, 11/\ ,,,,,,,,,

parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description='Import pass\rnrd dictionaries or leaks into the paSS\\Ord database')
parser.add_argument(
'-d', '--diet', help='pasrnord dictionar) filename (absolute path if not in current director))')
args = \ ars(parser.parse_args())

infilename = args['dict']

11t!.l111! .JI,

config = ConfigParser.ConfigParser()
config.read("conf/importer.conf')
host = config.get('dbaccess', 'dbhost')
user = config.get('dbaccess', 'dbuser')
pwd = config.get('dbaccess', 'dbpass')
dbcreds = [host, user, pwd]

crackability _db(infilename, dbcreds)

if

name

main

main()
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8.1.S

Crackstation Dictionary - Stats Generator (CrackstationDB)

?php

xdebug_disable();
error_reporti ng(O);
require_once('LookupTable.php');
$file= fopen($argv[J ], "r");
$stats_file = "stats.txt";
$md5= new LookupTable("crackstation-mdS.idx", "crackstation.txt", "md5");
$total= O;
$count = O;
while(!feotr$file))
{
$each pwd = fgets($file);
Seach_pwd= trim ($each_p\\ d);
$total = $total + I;
Sto_crack= md5($each_pwd);
$result= $md5->crack($to_crack);
if ($result !== FALSE) {
$count = $count + I;
echo "Cracked: ". $result[ ]. " Count:". $count." Total:".$total. "\n";
}
fclose($file);
$crack_percentage = ($count/$total) * IOfJ;
$crack_percentage = round($crack_percentage, 2);
$result_final =
''======-==============================Final============================
Password File: $argv[1]
Total Cracked Count: $count
Total pasS\\Ords in $argv[l]: $total
Percentage Cracked: $crack_percentage
"·'

print $result_final;
file put contents($stats_file, $result_final, FJLE_APPEND I LOCK_EX);

,, ...>
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Harvester for Datalossdb

8.1.6

It \f /· i11. II' J 1 ,/,,1/1
L, 1 li11l' ltl/

from _future_ import division
from datetime import datetime
from math import ceil
from mechanize import Browser
import bs4
import re
fl'jl('I 1 (. Jf)/(1 ._

ll/1J 1/1//>/-' I

urls = {'dbloss':
'http://datalossdb.org/search?data_t) pe%58%5D=P'A D&di rection=asc&order=reported_date'}
target_file = open('datalossdb_urls.list', 'a+')

111t11,::e ,,, ,n

b = Browser()
b.set_handle_robots(

\�)

b.addheaders = [('User-agent', 'Mozilla/5.0 (X 11: U: \
Linux i686: en-US: rv: 1.9.0. I)\
Gecko/2008071615 Fedora/3.0. I- I .fc9 Firefox/3.0. I')]

•A I

ti/I

1,1

b.open(' https ://data Iossdb.org/sessions/new')
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b.select_form(nr=O)
b['login'] = 'tarunmadiraju'
b['paSS\\Ord'] = \\c*Y9 I phR5j31MeZ /\ 8mv'
b.submit()

L /r1,

, /i/111/

1 t Ir i,

\'•

I /i,.�/ n,1

response = b.open(urls['dbloss'])
soup = bs4.Beautifu1Soup(response.read())

lie /t/(',//1 f1 ()/1/ fill I

I]

def get_first(total_incidents):

print "get_first", total_incidents

pages = int(ceil(total_incidents I 20))
print pages

ra\\_input("Continue 5?")
n

't cJ ,t t/u 1'11 [J

for page in ,range( I, pages + I):

page_url = 11 { pwd_base_url l &page= 1 page]\
".format(pwd_base_url=urls['dbloss'], page=page)
page_response = b.open(page_url)
soup_in = bs4.Beautifu1Soup(page_response.read())

RI\ I , th, fll///'i'/ f

for each in soup_in.find_all('a'):
if "/incidents/" in each['href]:

target_file.write("http://datalossdb.org/ ( incident_url J"
. format(incident_url=each['href]))
target_file. write("\n")
53

/ii/ill/

print" Harvesting Summary = : date) : : incidents)" \
.format(date=datetime.now().strftime('% Y%m%d'), incidents=new_count)
target_file.write(" Entr) = l date} : : incidents)"
.format(date=datetime.now().strftime('% Y%m%d'),
incidents=total_incidents))
target_fi I e. write("\n\n")
target_ftle.close()

defget_new(ne� _count, old_count):
pages_from = int(ceil(old_count / 2 ))
pages_to = int(ceil(new_count / 20))
(,ti!.!,, ,,,1111'1' f)
for page in \.range(pages_from, pages_to + ):
page_url = " ( p\, d_base_url l &page= : page]\
".format(pwd_base_url=urls['dbloss'], page=page)
page_response = b.open(page_url)
soup_in = bs4. Beautifu I Soup(page_response.read())

l iht I

RL

for each in soup_in.find_all('a'):
if" incidents/" in each['href]:
target_file.write("http://datalossdb.org/ { incident_url l"
. format(incident_url=each ['href]))
target_ftle.write("\n")
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target_file.write("\n")

lr,/)( /Id /),JJ', C \///),!, \[///7/1/,// \

print "Harvesting Summar) = ( date l : (incidents J" \

. format(date=datetime.now().strftime('o/o Y%m%d'), incidents=new_count)
target_file.write("Entry = (dateJ : {incidents}"
.format(date=datetime.now().strftime('o/o Yo/omo/od'),
incidents=new_count))
target_tile.write("\n\n ")
target_fi I e.c I ose()

def main():
I ,1,J/ /1////1 rd ()/

7/1

for each_span_tag in soup.tindAll('span'):
if "Displa) ing Incident" in each_span_tag.text:

current_incident_count = int(
each_span_tag.tindChildren('b')[ I ].text)

It

,,,

( /1"/( \ u

target_tile.seek(O, 0)
file_data = target_tile.read()
entries = re.findall(r'Entr) = .*', tile_data)
print"[+] Incidents harvested previous! ) : (entries) ".format(entries=entries)

11

if entries:

old_incident_count = int(entries[-1 ].split(":")[ ])
diff = current-incident-count - old-incident-count
if diff:

55

print"(+] Nev. incidents added. Difference:", diff
get_new(current_incident_count, old_incident_count)

else:
print"[+] No nev, paSS\,\Ord incidents"
elif not entries:
get_ ft rst(current_incident_count)

if

name

main

main()

•
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8.1.7

Harvester for Twitter

,,�, I· 111 c II' j

\ 111, }/

import codecs
import sys
import tweepy

1.,liJ t£!1111ir, ,I J.:

CONSUMER KEY = "--"
CONSUMER SECRET = "--"
ACCESS KEY="--"
ACCESS SECRET="--"

I

auth = tweepy.OAuthHandler(CONSUMER_KEY, CONSUMER_SECRET)
auth.set_access_token(ACCESS_KEY, ACCESS_SECRET)
api = tweepy.APl(auth)

\t I

def get_accounts():

accounts= {}
friends = api.get_user('P,\ nMagic').friends()
for friend in friends:

accounts[friend.screen_name]

=

friend.id

return accounts
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't 1/ !1< /' I,• �'<'I\

deftweets(account, tt):
/J\/ IJT TY

lf)I\

tweets_all = []

{\,

"/11

/'Ill/\

tweets_al I.append(api.user_timeline(id=account, count=200))

\I, 11,t1L! II'/ ( ;,, /

/'1 uJA«J {cl 5 I{\ 'L'/\ ,i,· l l

request = 0
while request< 18:
maxid = tweets_all[request].since_id
tweets_all.append(
api.user_timeline(id=account, count=2011, max_id=maxid))
request+= l
ifmaxid == tweets_all[request].since_id:
break
tf.write("== (acel ==\n".format(acc=account))
for tweets in tweets all:
for tweet in tweets:
tf.write(u' (t\\ eetl '.format(tweet=tweet.text))
tf.write("== End of (ace) ==\n".format(acc=account))
tf.write("\n\n")
I
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!'r,,u,1,1,l ,,f fifh /' il,17< 1,11/1 i11l /,,tfc I
Ill

#PastebinLeaks Specific Filter
for tv\ eets in tv\ eets aII:
for tv\eet in tweets:
if any( i in tv,eet.text for i in ['pass'. 'passv\ ord']):
print"[+] Passv\ord leak:". tv,eet.text
else:
#print"[-] Other leak:". t\,eet.text
pass

def main():
11'<1"

!', ,,\f

accounts = get_accounts()
tf= codecs.open('tv\eets_file.txt', \,', 'utf-8')

IL\ L /11 ( t /S Uf

/>,, II \f

,<T

for account in accounts:

tweets(account, tf)

if

name- =='-main
main()
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8.1.8

Harvester for Sku11Security

/{\/ hi11 di\ 1111h,1,,
- - c't)(/il/� 1/f/-i'\

import bs4
from mechanize import Browser

deftlll' I 'Rl

urls = {'skul !security': 'http://downloads.skullsecurit).org/passwords/'}
target_tile = open('skullsecurity_urls. Iist', 'w')

/1111

br = Browser()
br.set_handle_robots(

)

br.addheaders = [
('User-agent', 'Mozilla/5.0 (X 11: U: Linux i686: en-US: rv: 1.9.0. I) Gecko/20080716 I 5 Fedora/3.0. J
l .fc9 Firefox/3.0. I')]

1't.ltlL\f l cf\1/c

response = br.open(urls['skullsecurit) '])
soup = bs4.Beautifu1Soup(response.read())

Ir IL\ t /1L1\S ••,,,.,I t,f

for each in soup.find_all('a'):
if"/" not in each.string:

target_ ti le. write( each.string)
target_fi le.write("\n")
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